no ancestors of distinction

* * *

ĭmāgo, ĭnis, f. [cf. imitor], an imitation, copy of a thing, an image, likeness (i. e. a picture, statue, mask, an apparition, ghost, phantom; the latter only poet. and in post-Aug. prose; cf.: simulacrum, effigies, statua, sigillum): imago ab imitatione dicta, Paul. ex Fest. p. 112 Müll.; cf.: imago dicitur quasi imitago, Porphyr. Hor. C. 1, 12, 4.

Lit.

In gen., a representation, likeness (usu. of a person), statue, bust, picture:

Spartiates Agesilaus neque pictam neque fictam imaginem suam passus est esse... unus Xenophontis libellus in eo rege laudando facile omnes imagines omnium statuasque superavit,

Cic. Fam. 5, 12, 7:

Demosthenes, cujus nuper inter imagines tuas ac tuorum imaginem ex aere vidi,

id. Or. 31, 110:

Epicuri in poculis et in anulis,

id. Fin. 5, 1, 3: hominis imaginem gypso e facie ipsa primus omnium expressit ceraque in eam formam gypsi infusa emendare instituit Lysistratus Sicyonius, Plin. 35, 12, 44, § 153:

Africani,

Cic. Rep. 6, 10:

mulieris,

Quint. 7, 7, 5:

Antigoni,

id. 2, 13, 12:

depictam in tabula sipariove imaginem rei,

id. 6, 1, 32:

si in tabula mea aliquis pinxerit velut imaginem,

Gai. Inst. 2, 78:

cereae,

Hor. Epod. 17, 76; id. S. 1, 8, 43:

ut dignus venias hederis et imagine macra,

Juv. 7, 29:

hoc tibi sub nostra breve carmen imagine vivat,

Mart. 9, 1:

epistula atque imago me certum fecit,

i. e. the image on the seal, the signet, Plaut. Ps. 4, 6, 35; 4, 2, 29; 4, 7, 105:

nunc amici anne inimici sis imago, Alcesime, mihi, sciam,

i. e. will act like a friend, Plaut. Cas. 3, 1, 1.—

A phantom, ghost, apparition:

infelix simulacrum atque ipsius umbra Creusae Visa mihi ante oculos et nota major imago,

Verg. A. 2, 773; cf.:

et nunc magna mei sub terras ibit imago,

shade, spirit, Verg. A. 4, 654; Plin. Ep. 7, 27, 6; cf. id. ib. 1:

non vanae redeat sanguis imagini,

Hor. C. 1, 24, 15:

(somnus) Vanum nocturnis fallit imaginibus,

Tib. 3, 4, 56; cf. Hor. C. 3, 27, 40; Suet. Aug. 94; id. Calig. 50:

te videt in somnis, tua sacra et major imago humana turbat pavidum,

Juv. 13, 221:

quid natum totiens falsis Ludis imaginibus?

phantoms, Verg. A. 1, 408:

ubique pavor et plurima mortis imago,

id. ib. 2, 369; cf.:

repetitaque mortis imago,

Ov. M. 10, 726:

lurida mortis imago,

Petr. 123, v. 257:

varia pereuntium forma et omni imagine mortium,

Tac. H. 3, 28:

caesorum insepultorumque,

id. A. 1, 62:

supremorum (i. e. funeris) imago,

id. H. 4, 45.— Poet.:

genitiva (with forma),

natural shape, figure, Ov. M. 3, 331; so,

rudis et sine imagine tellus (= informis),

shapeless, id. ib. 1, 87.—

In partic., an ancestral image of a distinguished Roman (of one who had been aedile, praetor, or consul; usually made of wax, and placed in the atrium of a Roman house, and carried in funeral processions.—

In plur.: obrepsisti ad honores errore hominum, commendatione fumosarum imaginum, quarum simile habes nihil praeter colorem, of smoky (i. e. old) ancestral images, Cic. Pis. 1, 1; cf. Sen. Ben. 3, 28, 1; Plin. 35, 2, 2, § 6:

si quid deliquero, nullae sunt imagines, quae me a vobis deprecentur,

no ancestors of distinction, Cic. Agr. 2, 36, 100; cf.:

quia imagines non habeo et quia mihi nova nobilitas est,

Sall. J. 85, 25:

qui imagines familiae suae consecuti sunt,

Cic. Agr. 2, 1, 1:

homo veteris prosapiae ac multarum imaginum,

Sall. J. 85, 10:

majorum imagines,

id. ib. 5, 5; Suet. Vesp. 1:

multis in familia senatoriis imaginibus,

id. Aug. 4:

esto beata, funus atque imagines Ducant triumphales tuum,

Hor. Epod. 8, 11:

qui stupet in titulis et imaginibus,

id. S. 1, 6, 17; Plin. 35, 2, 2, § 6 sqq.; Prop. 2, 13, 19; Suet. Vesp. 19.—

In sing. (rare):

jus imaginis,

Cic. Verr. 2, 5, 14, § 36:

imaginis ornandae causa,

id. Sest. 8, 19:

vir honoratissimae imaginis futurus ad posteros,

Liv. 3, 58, 2:

clarum hac fore imagine Scaptium,

would become an aristocrat, id. 3, 72, 4, v. Weissenb. ad loc.:

Tunc Cotta ne imago Libonis exsequias posterorum comitaretur censuit,

Tac. A. 2, 32.

Transf., a reverberation of sound, an echo (mostly poet.):

(mellaria facere oportet) potissimum ubi non resonent imagines,

Varr. R. R. 3, 16, 12:

concava pulsu Saxa sonant, vocisque offensa resultat imago,

Verg. G. 4, 50; cf. Sil. 14, 365:

alternae deceptus imagine vocis: Huc coëamus ait... Coëamus retulit Echo,

Ov. M. 3, 385:

cujus recinit jocosa Nomen imago,

Hor. C. 1, 12, 4; so,

jocosa Vaticani montis,

id. ib. 1, 20, 8:

vaga,

Val. Fl. 3, 596.

Trop.

In gen., an image or likeness of a thing formed in the mind, a conception, thought, imagination, idea:

Scipionis memoriam atque imaginem sibi proponere,

Cic. Lael. 27, 102:

magnam partem noctium in imagine tua vigil exigo,

Plin. Ep. 7, 5, 1:

Verginium cogito, Verginium video, Verginium jam vanis imaginibus audio,

id. ib. 2, 1, 12: imagines, quae eidôla nominant, quorum incursione non solum videmus, sed etiam cogitamus, Cic. Fin. 1, 6, 21; cf.:

imagines extrinsecus in animos nostros per corpus irrumpere,

id. Ac. 2, 40, 125: plena sunt imaginum omnia, nulla species cogitari potest nisi pulsu imaginum, etc.; id. Div. 2, 67, 137 sq.: unum aliquem te ex barbatis illis, exemplum imperii veteris, imaginem antiquitatis, columen rei publicae diceres intueri, an image of the olden time, id. Sest. 8, 19; cf.:

expressam imaginem vitae quotidianae videre,

id. Rosc. Am. 16, 47:

quidnam illi consules dictatoresve facturi essent, qui proconsularem imaginem tam saevam ac trucem fecerint, i. e. by cruelty in office,

Liv. 5, 2, 9:

naturae... urbis et populi,

Cic. Rep. 2, 39 fin.:

justitiae,

Quint. 2, 20, 6:

virtutis,

id. 10, 2, 15:

similitudines ad exprimendas rerum imagines compositae,

id. 8, 3, 72: illae rerum imagines, quas vocari phantasias indicavimus, id. 10, 7, 15:

conscripta formantur imagine templa,

plans, Stat. S. 3, 1, 117:

scipione determinata prius templi imagine in solo,

Plin. 28, 2, 4, § 15:

tua, pater Druse, imago,

memory, Tac. A. 1, 13:

magna illic imago tristium laetorumque,

recollection, id. ib. 2, 53:

si te nulla movet tantae pietatis imago,

Verg. A. 6, 405.—

In partic.

In rhet., a figurative representation, similitude, comparison:

comparabile est, quod in rebus diversis similem aliquam rationem continet. Ejus partes sunt tres: imago, collatio, exemplum. Imago est oratio demonstrans corporum aut naturarum similitudinem, etc.,

Cic. Inv. 1, 30, 49; cf.:

imago est formae cum forma cum quadam similitudine collatio,

Auct. Her. 4, 49, 62; Sen. Ep. 59, 92; Quint. 6, 1, 28; Hor. S. 2, 3, 320; id. Ep. 1, 7, 34.—

With the idea predominating of mere imitation, in opp. to what is original or real, a mere form, image, semblance, appearance, shadow:

consectatur nullam eminentem effigiem virtutis, sed adumbratam imaginem gloriae,

Cic. Tusc. 3, 2, 3:

nos veri juris germanaeque justitiae solidam et expressam effigiem nullam tenemus: umbra et imaginibus utimur,

id. Off. 3, 17, 69; cf.:

non in umbra et imagine civitatis, etc.,

id. Rep. 2, 30; and:

umbram equitis Romani et imaginem videtis,

id. Rab. Post. 15, 41:

haec ars tota dicendi, sive artis imago quaedam est et similitudo, habet hanc vim, ut, etc.,

id. de Or. 2, 87, 356:

judiciorum,

only the appearance of courts, id. Sest. 13, 30; cf.:

imaginem rei publicae nullam reliquissent,

id. Agr. 2, 32, 88:

his quoque imaginibus juris spretis,

Liv. 41, 8, 10:

imaginem retinendi largiendive penes nos, vim penes Parthos,

Tac. A. 15, 14:

habitu et ore ad exprimendam imaginem honesti exercitus,

the pretence, id. ib. 16, 32; 6, 27; id. H. 1, 84; 3, 70:

qui faciem eloquentiae, non imaginem praestaret,

id. Or. 34:

nec imagine rerum, sed rebus incendit,

Quint. 10, 1, 16:

in falsa rerum imagine detineri,

id. 10, 5, 17; cf.:

nullo quippe alio vincis discrimine, quam quod illi (hermae) marmoreum caput est, tua vivit imago,

Juv. 8, 55.—

A representative: non in effigies mutas divinum (Augusti) spiritum transfusum;

sed imaginem veram, caelesti sanguine ortam, intellegere discrimen, etc.,

Tac. A. 4, 52.—

That which suggests or recalls something by resemblance, a reminder:

me consolatur recordatio meorum temporum, quorum imaginem video in rebus tuis,

Cic. Fam. 1, 6, 2:

a Corbulone petierat, ne quam imaginem servitii Tiridates perferret,

nothing to suggest slavery, Tac. A. 15, 31; cf.:

moriar, si praeter te quemquam reliquum habeo, in quo possim imaginem antiquae et vernaculae festivitatis adgnoscere,

Cic. Fam. 9, 15, 2.

* * *

   1) The Knowledge of Ourselves

   We come therefore now to that knowledge whereunto the ancient oracle directeth us, which is the knowledge of ourselves; which deserveth the more accurate handling, by how much it toucheth us more nearly. This knowledge, as it is the end and term of natural philosophy in the intention of man, so notwithstanding it is but a portion of natural philosophy in the continent of nature.... [W]e proceed to human philosophy or Humanity, which hath two parts: the one considereth man segregate, or distributively; the other congregate, or in society. So as Human philosophy is either Simple and Particular, or Conjugate and Civil. Humanity Particular consisteth of the same parts whereof man consisteth; that is, of knowledges which respect the Body, and of knowledges that respect the Mind... how the one discloseth the other and how the one worketh upon the other... [:] the one is honored with the inquiry of Aristotle, and the other of Hippocrates. (Bacon, 1878, pp. 236-237)

   2) As a Science, Psychology Is Distinct

   The claims of Psychology to rank as a distinct science are... not smaller but greater than those of any other science. If its phenomena are contemplated objectively, merely as nervo-muscular adjustments by which the higher organisms from moment to moment adapt their actions to environing co-existences and sequences, its degree of specialty, even then, entitles it to a separate place. The moment the element of feeling, or consciousness, is used to interpret nervo-muscular adjustments as thus exhibited in the living beings around, objective Psychology acquires an additional, and quite exceptional, distinction. (Spencer, 1896, p. 141)

   3) Psychology Can Never Be an Exact Natural Science

   Kant once declared that psychology was incapable of ever raising itself to the rank of an exact natural science. The reasons that he gives... have often been repeated in later times. In the first place, Kant says, psychology cannot become an exact science because mathematics is inapplicable to the phenomena of the internal sense; the pure internal perception, in which mental phenomena must be constructed,-time,-has but one dimension. In the second place, however, it cannot even become an experimental science, because in it the manifold of internal observation cannot be arbitrarily varied,-still less, another thinking subject be submitted to one's experiments, comformably to the end in view; moreover, the very fact of observation means alteration of the observed object. (Wundt, 1904, p. 6)

   4) How a " Mathematical" Psychology May Be Realized in Practice

   It is [Gustav] Fechner's service to have found and followed the true way; to have shown us how a "mathematical psychology" may, within certain limits, be realized in practice.... He was the first to show how Herbart's idea of an "exact psychology" might be turned to practical account. (Wundt, 1904, pp. 6-7)

   5) The Rights of Psychology as Science

   "Mind," "intellect," "reason," "understanding," etc. are concepts... that existed before the advent of any scientific psychology. The fact that the naive consciousness always and everywhere points to internal experience as a special source of knowledge, may, therefore, be accepted for the moment as sufficient testimony to the rights of psychology as science.... "Mind," will accordingly be the subject, to which we attribute all the separate facts of internal observation as predicates. The subject itself is determined p. 17) wholly and exclusively by its predicates. (Wundt, 1904,

   6) The Study of Animal Psychology

   The study of animal psychology may be approached from two different points of view. We may set out from the notion of a kind of comparative physiology of mind, a universal history of the development of mental life in the organic world. Or we may make human psychology the principal object of investigation. Then, the expressions of mental life in animals will be taken into account only so far as they throw light upon the evolution of consciousness in man.... Human psychology... may confine itself altogether to man, and generally has done so to far too great an extent. There are plenty of psychological text-books from which you would hardly gather that there was any other conscious life than the human. (Wundt, 1907, pp. 340-341)

   7) The Behaviorist's Formulation

   The Behaviorist began his own formulation of the problem of psychology by sweeping aside all medieval conceptions. He dropped from his scientific vocabulary all subjective terms such as sensation, perception, image, desire, purpose, and even thinking and emotion as they were subjectively defined. (Watson, 1930, pp. 5-6)

   8) Man Is a Microcosm

   According to the medieval classification of the sciences, psychology is merely a chapter of special physics, although the most important chapter; for man is a microcosm; he is the central figure of the universe. (deWulf, 1956, p. 125)

   9) Brief Overview of Psychology's History

   At the beginning of this century the prevailing thesis in psychology was Associationism.... Behavior proceeded by the stream of associations: each association produced its successors, and acquired new attachments with the sensations arriving from the environment.

   In the first decade of the century a reaction developed to this doctrine through the work of the Wurzburg school. Rejecting the notion of a completely self-determining stream of associations, it introduced the task ( Aufgabe) as a necessary factor in describing the process of thinking. The task gave direction to thought. A noteworthy innovation of the Wurzburg school was the use of systematic introspection to shed light on the thinking process and the contents of consciousness. The result was a blend of mechanics and phenomenalism, which gave rise in turn to two divergent antitheses, Behaviorism and the Gestalt movement. The behavioristic reaction insisted that introspection was a highly unstable, subjective procedure.... Behaviorism reformulated the task of psychology as one of explaining the response of organisms as a function of the stimuli impinging upon them and measuring both objectively. However, Behaviorism accepted, and indeed reinforced, the mechanistic assumption that the connections between stimulus and response were formed and maintained as simple, determinate functions of the environment.

   The Gestalt reaction took an opposite turn. It rejected the mechanistic nature of the associationist doctrine but maintained the value of phenomenal observation. In many ways it continued the Wurzburg school's insistence that thinking was more than association-thinking has direction given to it by the task or by the set of the subject. Gestalt psychology elaborated this doctrine in genuinely new ways in terms of holistic principles of organization.

   Today psychology lives in a state of relatively stable tension between the poles of Behaviorism and Gestalt psychology.... (Newell & Simon, 1963, pp. 279-280)

    10) Psychological Research Is Not Building toward Systematic Clarity

   As I examine the fate of our oppositions, looking at those already in existence as guide to how they fare and shape the course of science, it seems to me that clarity is never achieved. Matters simply become muddier and muddier as we go down through time. Thus, far from providing the rungs of a ladder by which psychology gradually climbs to clarity, this form of conceptual structure leads rather to an ever increasing pile of issues, which we weary of or become diverted from, but never really settle. (Newell, 1973b, pp. 288-289)

    11) Psychology as a Scientific Discipline

   The subject matter of psychology is as old as reflection. Its broad practical aims are as dated as human societies. Human beings, in any period, have not been indifferent to the validity of their knowledge, unconcerned with the causes of their behavior or that of their prey and predators. Our distant ancestors, no less than we, wrestled with the problems of social organization, child rearing, competition, authority, individual differences, personal safety. Solving these problems required insights-no matter how untutored-into the psychological dimensions of life. Thus, if we are to follow the convention of treating psychology as a young discipline, we must have in mind something other than its subject matter. We must mean that it is young in the sense that physics was young at the time of Archimedes or in the sense that geometry was "founded" by Euclid and "fathered" by Thales. Sailing vessels were launched long before Archimedes discovered the laws of bouyancy [ sic], and pillars of identical circumference were constructed before anyone knew that C IID. We do not consider the ship builders and stone cutters of antiquity physicists and geometers. Nor were the ancient cave dwellers psychologists merely because they rewarded the good conduct of their children. The archives of folk wisdom contain a remarkable collection of achievements, but craft-no matter how perfected-is not science, nor is a litany of successful accidents a discipline. If psychology is young, it is young as a scientific discipline but it is far from clear that psychology has attained this status. (Robinson, 1986, p. 12)